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Microsoft's Encarta encyclopedia, an on-line reference tool, says that
salmon canneries are a big industry on the Pacific Coast. It is true that salmon
canneries were a major employer on the Pacific Coast of the United States 30
years ago; some were still there 20 years ago. But salmon up and down the
Pacific coast are in decline; Columbia River salmon have been in decline for
decades. There has not been a harvest targeted on Columbia River spring
chinook salmon for more than 20 years and for summer chinook, it has been
longer. Snake River coho salmon officially became extinct in 1987. Currently, you
can count on one hand the number of sockeye salmon returning to Idaho. In the
last four years, while Snake River salmon have been on the Endangered Species
list, the declines have continued and many wild salmon subpopulations are at
the edge of oblivion. In most coastal communities, salmon canneries are a thing
of the past. Someone should alert Bill Gates.
If we placed preeminent value on recovering salmon populations, there
would be no secret about how to do it: we would restore the salmon ecosystem.
But there is also no secret about why this hasn't happened. What was once a
salmon ecosystem is now the habitat of millions of human beings who carry on
their activities in and around the Columbia River system. The system is sprawling,
composed of many watersheds in four states and two nations; countless
tributaries; a mainstem river 1,200 miles long; a large estuary; and a big swath of
the Pacific Ocean. Human development has broken up the salmon ecosystem into
dispersed fragments which, if salmon are going to thrive, need to be rehabilitated
and reconnected.' This presents the Northwest with a series of difficult questions:
* General Counsel, Northwest Power Planning Council, Portland, Oregon. From
a speech to the University of Colorado Natural Resource Center's conference on
Biodiversity Protection, June 9-12, 1996. The views expressed in this article are mine,
not the Power Planning Council's. I am grateful for the suggestions of my colleague
John Shurts, Senior Counsel to the Power Planning Council.
1. See INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFic GROUP, RETURN TO THE RIVER, RESTORATION OF SALMONID
FISHERIES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER ECOSYSTEM, DEVELOPMENT AND SYNTHESIS OF SCIENCE
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Can the salmon ecosystem be restored without seriously undermining the human
activities that degrade it? If human activity must be sacrificed to ecosystem
recovery, can ecosystem recovery happen? If ecosystem recovery is unrealistic,
what does this bode for the sustainability of the ecological systems on which
much human activity depends?
For fifteen years, the Northwest has been trying to restore Columbia River
salmon with what by any standard is an impressive collection of tools, including
the Endangered Species Act. Given the fact.that wild salmon continue to decline,
it is fair to ask how these tools are working. This paper reviews the Endangered
Species Act program on the Columbia River and makes two points, which are
intended less as criticisms than as observations. First, the Endangered Species
Act process is geared towards species recovery, which is different from ecosystem
recovery. As scientists continue to push recovery programs toward ecosystem
approaches, we may see changes in the Endangered Species Act program, but the
changes have not yet happened. Second, even if the Endangered Species Act
process took an ecosystem approach, it still would be faced with major economic
and political challenges. That these challenges exist is not an argument against
the recovery effort. But the nature of these difficulties, combined with other
limitations of the Endangered Species Act's tools, suggest that restoring wild
Columbia River salmon to self-sustaining levels will require much more than the
Endangered Species Act itself can deliver.
11. Background
A. The Salmon Ecosystem, the Working River and the Decline of
Salmon
The ecosystem of Columbia River salmon is bigger than the Columbia River.
Salmon are bom inland: some are born in headwater tributaries far in the interior
parts of the region in high mountainous areas. As they begin to grow, young salmon
move downstream, beginning a migration to the Pacific Ocean. Once they leave the
tributaries and enter the main river, juvenile salmon must find their way past a
series of large dams. If they survive, they reach the Columbia River estuary where
they spend time feeding and undergo a physiological conversion from freshwater
fish to saltwater fish. When the transition to saltwater is complete, they spend
UNDERLYING THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM OF THE NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL 12 (Sept. 10, 1996) (hereinafter RETURN TO THE RIVER).
2. A group of eminent scientists recently characterized a variation of the dilemma this
way: "If human activities are to be sustainable, we need to ensure that the ecological systems
on which our economies depend are resilient. The problem involved in devising environmental
policies is to ensure that resilience is maintained, even though the limits on the nature and
scale of economic activities thus required are necessarily uncertain." Kenneth Arrow et al.,
Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity and the Environment, 268 SCIENCE 520, 521 (Apr. 28, 1995).
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several years in the Pacific Ocean growing to mature size, which can be anywhere
from about 10 to more than 100 pounds. After several years in the ocean, the mature
fish reenter the river. Once in the river, they stop feeding and start a long and
difficult migration back to their spawning grounds, past dams and thermal
blockages, into the tributaries and up to the place of their birth. There, if spawning
gravels have not been covered by silt eroded from the neighboring watershed, the
fish spawn and die. Their progeny repeat the cycle. Historically, countless
populations of salmon made similar trips from headwaters of Canadian and
American streams. It is one of the great and mysterious natural cycles, characteristic
of a vibrant natural world.
Today, at almost each point in the salmon migration, human activities
impinge: mining and logging in the headwaters; irrigation depletion and
agricultural runoff in the middle reaches of the rivers; industrial and urban water
pollution at several points; an estuary that collects pollutants locally an from
upriver; and ocean environment that varies with changes in global temperature;'
fishing in the ocean and in the river; and at many places along the way, dams.
Most of the life of a salmon is spent in the ocean. More than any other
factor, ocean conditions explain year-to-year fluctuations in salmon
populations. However, we do not know much about ocean conditions, how
they are changing, and how salmon are affected. Because there is not much
we can do about the ocean, most of the attention in salmon recovery is
devoted to the inland ecosystem, especially rivers.
The Columbia River's tributaries absorb the impacts of development
activities in surrounding watersheds: timber harvest, grazing, irrigations, mining,
urbanization and other development. In the mainstem of the Columbia, dams
slow the migration, heat up the river, subject fish to pressure changes and
.descaling and affect food production in the river. Dams have converted the river
to something resembling a series of lakes, which are more hospitable to salmon
predators like squawfish than they are to salmon. The dams have inundated
what was once productive streamside habitat. They have simplified the river's
complexity by eliminating braided channels and hydrologic processes that once
were part of important food and energy chains.
The Columbia River hydropower dams provide about a third of the
Northwest's electric energy, the largest interconnected hydropower system
in the world. It produces billions of dollars of revenues every year, even after
paying for other public purposes such as irrigation assistance. Navigation
locks and calm reservoirs permit barge traffic as far inland as Lewiston,
Idaho, enabling farmers to ship crops to international markets. When
Portland escaped inundation in the wet spring of 1996, the Army Corps of
Engineers estimated that without the dams, parts of downtown Portland
would have been under seven feet of water.
In engineering the river, a great deal of natural salmon productivity
was lost. From historic peaks ranging from 10 to 16 million adult fish, the
Columbia River salmon runs have declined to approximately a million adult
fish. As bleak as this number is, it understates the decline of the wild
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salmon stocks that many people see as the "seed corn" for the salmon runs.
By the late 1980s, wild salmon populations up and down the Pacific Coast
were reported to be at critically low numbers.3 In 1995, returns were worse
and the only thing that appears capable of reversing the declines in the
short term is significant improvement in ocean conditions.
The diversity of salmon populations, which is key to their long term
viability, is tied in part to the availability of diverse, connected habitats.
Different salmon populations are genetically adapted to different tributaries.
While the relationships among these populations are not entirely
understood, scientists theorize that although salmon populations are
adapted to local, tributaries, they are also part of what is called
"metapopulations," an aggregation of smaller populations that mix, stray,
and support each other. When one population is weak, stronger populations
can send recruits to help rebuild them. The diversity of populations is
thought to contribute to the long-term strength and resilience of the
metapopulation. For metapopulations to function, they need diverse,
healthy habitats in some proximity to each other.
Human development has left very few healthy, connected salmon
habitats.5 A good deal of salmon habitat was degraded in the nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries. 6 Much more habitat-in the neighborhood of
30-40 percent of the habitat that was accessible-has been blocked by high
dams built after 1930, and these habitat were further degraded by water and
land activities after that time. Salmon habitat has become highly
fragmented-a stream reach here and a reach there, far removed from each
other. When there is so little connection between the fragments, the
interchange that defines metapopulations is thought to be compromised.
B. Remedial Salmon Legislation
In the 1970s and 1980s, a large body of law and regulation developed
in response to the salmon declines:7
3. See Willa Nelson et al., Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks at Risk From
California, Oregon, Idaho and Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4 (Mar.-Apr. 991).
4. See generally, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM, SALMON AND SOCIETY IN
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 135 (1995); RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 1, at 76.
5. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 58.
6. Joseph E. Taylor II1, Making Salmon: Economy, Culture and Science in the Oregon
Fisheries, Precontact to 1960 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington).
7. The best accounts are Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel K. Connor, The Law of the Pacific
Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 KANSAS L.
REV. 17, 48-61 (1983); Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's
Anadromous Fish Resources With the Federal Columbia River Power System. I I ENvrL. L. 211 (1981 ).
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In litigation over fish harvest in the Columbia River and Puget
Sound, Indian tribes established the right to harvest up to half of the
salmon runs.8 They also asserted a right to have salmon habitat
protected from degradation.9 The latter principle was not entirely
resolved, but it bears directly on all activities that affect salmon
habitat, including the operations of the Columbia River dams."0
* The Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act and Management Act of
1976" created fishery management councils composed of
government agencies and representatives of user groups to
coordinate fish harvest in the ocean.
* The Salmon and Steelhead Conservation Act'2 promised to address
the problem of overlapping and sometimes conflicting fish and
wildlife agency management jurisdictions. This Act also promised
(but failed to deliver) federal funding for habitat restoration.
* Creating what has turned out to be the most important source of
fish and wildlife mitigation funding, Congress enacted the
Northwest Power Act'3 and a four-state Northwest Power
Planning Council to develop a plan for the Northwest's energy
needs and to offset the fish and wildlife impacts of the Columbia
River hydropower dams.'4 The resulting fish and wildlife program
is implemented by hydropower revenues and the federal agencies
that control the dams, calling for millions of acre-feet of water to
augment river flows for salmon.
8. The seminal cases are Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969); United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W. D. Wash. 1974); Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). There is a large
amount of literature on the treaty fishing cases. See e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 441 (1982). See also CHARLES F. WILJNSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN:
LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 175 (1992); FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE
CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS (1986).
9. See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash.), appeal
dismissed United States v. Washington, No. 81-3111 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1984). See also
Michael C. Blumm, Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?, 22 IDAHO. L. REV. 629, 636-67 (1986).
10. See Authority of Bonneville Power Administrator to Participate in Funding of Program
to Help Restore the Columbia River Anadromous Fishery, 83 I.D. 589 (Nov. 22, 1976).
1I. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1996)).
12. Pub. L. No. 96-561,90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3345 (1996)).
13. See Pub. L. No. 96-501,94 Stat. 2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839(h) (1996)).
14. See Roy Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins and
Future Role, 13 ENVTL. L. 673 (1983); Kai N. Lee, The Path Along the Ridge, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 317 (1983); John M. Volkman, Rethinking Development in the Western Environment, in
BEYONDTHE MYTHIC WEST 105, 115-17 (Stuart L. Udall et al. eds., 1990).
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" In 1985, the United States and Canada signed a treaty designed
to protect each country's ocean salmon populations from the
other country's fishermen. 5
* In 1986, the federal government, three Northwest states and the
region's Indian tribes negotiated a settlement of fish harvest
issues in the Columbia River.'
6
* In 1987, the Power Planning Council adopted a "Protected Areas"
program identifying 44,000 stream miles of Northwest rivers
where new hydropower facilities should not be licensed because
of potential fish and wildlife conflicts.
Notwithstanding these developments, wild salmon declines in the late 1980s
were dramatic and alarming. Some remedial programs functioned better than
others, but all ran into obstacles.'7 A seven-year drought and persistently poor (for
salmon) ocean conditions followed. Populations that had looked healthy in 1988
were weak enough in 1990 to prompt Endangered Species Act petitions.
The Endangered Species Act's reputation as a "pit bull" preceded it.
Immediately after the Endangered Species Act petitions were filed, Oregon's.
Senator Mark Hatfield, a veteran of the Northwest's wrenching experience
with northern spotted owl Endangered Species Act listings, urged the region
to take early steps to put an effective recovery plan into place, and if
possible, to moot the petitions.' In 1990 and 1991, Senator Hatfield and the
15. See Treaty on Pacific Salmon, United States-Canada, TREATY Doc. No. 99-2 (1985)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644 (1994)). See also Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-Canada
Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historical and Legal Overview, 16 ENVTL. L. 363 (1986).
16. The Columbia River Fish Management Plan, approved by the federal district
court in United States v. State of Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Ore. 1988), affd 913 f.2d
576 (9th cir. 1990). For background, see Penny H. Harrison, The Evolution of a New
Comprehensive Plan for Managing Columbia River Anadromous Fish, 16 ENVTL. L. 705 (1986).
17. For example, the proposals of the commission appointed to develop management
recommendations under the Salmon and Steelhead Conservation Act, the Salmon and
Steelhead Advisory Commission, were rejected by the Secretary of Commerce. See SALMON &
STEELHEAD ADVISORY COMM'N, U.S. NAT. MARINE FISHERIES SERv., A NEW MANAGEMENT STRucruRE FOR
ANADROMOUS SALMON AND STEELHEAD RESOURCES AND RISHERIES OF THE WASHINGTON AND COWMBA
RIvER CONSERVAnON AREAS (1984); Letter from Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce, to
William Wilkerson, Director, Washington Department of Fisheries (Nov. 5, 1986). The United
States-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty has hit a series of potholes and is reported to be in "grave
danger," See Canada-U.S. salmon pact said to be in peril, DAILY ASTORIAN, April 18, 1996. The Northwest
Power Act program has had successes, but also has come in for its share of criticism. See Michael
C. Blumm &Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise: Hydrpower, Salmon, and Endangered Species
in the Columbia River Basin, 21 Er'iL. L. 657 (1991).
18. See Endangered Species Petitions on Columbia and Snake Rivers, Joint Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Senate Committee on Appropriations
and the House Committee on Small Business, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1991 ).
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governors of the four Northwest states watched over a mediated process
called the "Salmon Summit." After six months of discussions, summit
participants agreed to provide more water for salmon; federal land managers
strengthened their commitment to address habitat problems on federal
lands; and a wide array of interests were brought into recovery discussions.' 9
There were contentious issues the Salmon Summit could not resolve.
How much more water should be used to augment flows for salmon? What
kinds of structural changes should be made in the dams? How much farther
should fish harvest be reduced? How could the adverse effects of hatcheries
be mitigated? For these issues, consensus was elusive, and the region
turned to the Power Planning Council (Council).
In 1991 and 1992, the Council conducted an administrative rulemaking
process 2° that resulted in The Strategy for Salmon.2' The Strategy approved funding
for high-priority habitat projects, including measures to protect wild stock from
hatchery stocks, and added about 3 million acre-feet to the 3.45 million acre-
feet that was already part of the Council's flow augmentation program. In the
Snake River, the Council accepted the flow augmentation water offered in the
Salmon Summit and added it to the then-existing program.
However, the Council found that these measures were not enough, and
so it called for evaluations of other salmon recovery options: lowering
reservoir levels to create a faster flowing river; investment in water
efficiencies, water marketing, and other means to leave more water in rivers
for salmon; and alternative power system operations that could make it
easier to devote the river to serving fish needs. The Council also called for
known-stock fishing techniques to target strong fish stocks and help avoid
weak fish stocks; closer scrutiny of hatchery impacts on wild fish populations
to protect weak, wild salmon stocks; and more effective ways to protect fish
and wildlife habitat, based on watershed-wide initiatives.
2
19. See Oversight Hearing on Petitioned Salmon Stocks for Endangered Species Listing,
Hearing before a Subcommittee on the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess (1992). Two articles taking very different view of these events were published at
about the time the salmon summit concluded its work. Compare Blumm & Simrin, The
Unraveling of the Parity Promise, supra note 17, with Kai N. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence:
Salmon, Science, and Law in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 745 (1991).
20. The Council uses a unique form of rulemaking that observed specific
requirements of the Northwest Power Act (hereinafter NPA), 16 U.S.C. § 839(b)(h)
(1996), and informal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 839(b)(d)(l).
21. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, I STRATEGY FOR SALMON (1992).
22. See generally, NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 2 STRATEGY FOR SALMON
(1992). For a review of these developments and their relationship to the Salmon
Summit, see Columbia River Basin Salmon Recovery Efforts, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
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Environmental groups, an Indian tribe and industrial groups all challenged
the Strategy for Salmon. While the fact that the Council had apparently offended
such a wide spectrum of interests suggested to some that the Council had struck a
balance, in Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council,2"
the Ninth Circuit found the program to be flawed. The court held that the Council
had not made appropriate findings on the recommendations received in the
process, had not incorporated the findings in the program itself, and had not
made clear the relationship between the program's specific measures and a
system of biological objectives. This procedural holding was accompanied by
expansive dicta, including an interpretation of the Northwest Power Act under
which the Council would give "a high degree of deference" to the fish and wildlife
agencies' and tribes' judgments on fish and wildlife mitigation.24 The court also
criticized the scope of the Council's action: "The Council's approach seems largely
to have been from the premise that only small steps are possible, in light of
entrenched river user claims of economic hardship.25
Before the ruling was handed down, the Council had completed the further
evaluations the Strategy for Salmon had called for, including a scientific context for
mainstem measures, and was poised to make decisions on reservoir drawdowns
and other measures. In December 1994, three months after the Northwest Resource
Information Center ruling, the Council completed revisions to the Strategy.2 6 There
23. 35 F.3d 13741 (9th cir. 1994).
24. The Northwest Power Act directs the Coundl to develop a fish and wildlife program on
the basis of "recommendations" submitted by fish and wildlife agencies, tribes and others. The
Coundl must evaluate the recommendations in light of several criteria including for example, that
the program must "complement the existing and future activities" of the agencies and tribes, 16
U.S.C. § 839B9)(h)(A), and be consistent with the legal rights of Indian tribes, 16 U.S.C. §
839(b)(h)(6)(D). In saying that the Coundl must accord a high degree of deference to the fish and
wildlife agencies and tribes, the Northwest Resource Information Center opinion, Northwest Resources
Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning, 35 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994), emphasized a
statement made by the chairman of one of the two house committees that reported on the
Northwest Power bill regarding a provision in the bill that was not adopted. The court expanded
on one part of the legislative statement, that "the Council should rely heavily on the fish and
wildlife agendes.and not try to become a super fish and wildlife entity." Id. at 1388 (quoting 126
CONG. REc. EI0683 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980)). The court also discounted another part of the
legislator's statement, that the Act's fish and wildlife criteria were not intended to "provide a legal
basis for challenging the program." See id. at 1389 n. 37 (quoting 126 CONG. REc. E 10683 (daily ed.
Nov. 17, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Dingell)). By this route, the dicta conclude that not only must the
Coundl accord "a high degree of deference" to the agencies' and tribes' judgments, but that the
agencies' and tribes' interpretations of the NPA's fish and wildlife provisions are entitled to
deference. Id. at 1388-93.
25. Northwest Resource Information Center, 35 F.3d at 1371.
26. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND
WILDLIFE PROGRAM (Dec. 1994).
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were major departures in the new program for the Snake River. First, the Council
put the mainstem measures in an experimental context. Each measure would be
part of a head-to-head evaluation of the survival of fish that are transported by
barge and fish that are left in the river. This experimental approach is an aspect of
the Council's "adaptive management" strategy, premised on the idea that fish and
wildlife measures should be seen as a series of experiments, with formal
experimental designs to help to answer critical questions about the interaction of
humans and the ecosystem." By structuring salmon recovery measures as
experiments, the Council can take action and learn from the results. Although
adaptive management had proved difficult to apply in the mainstem of the
Columbia River,"' the Council was determined to establish an experimental
framework for mainstem measures. The Council invited a group of scientists to a
workshop to identify areas of agreement and disagreement regarding the
effectiveness of flow augmentation, reservoir drawdowns and barge
transportation. The results of the workshops established a framework for
experimentation in the mainstem, which was ultimately included in the Strategy.
Within this experimental context, the Council proposed to implement and
evaluate a series of mainstem measures: 1) a reservoir drawdown program for
the Lower Snake River dams and the John Day project on the Columbia; 2)
reductions in an Army Corps of Engineers program that barges juvenile fish in
the Snake River; and 3) efforts to secure an additional million acre-feet of flow
augmentation water from the Snake River Basin, using market transactions,
efficiency efforts, and other non-structural measures. In the Columbia, the
Council added another 1.3 million acre-feet of water to the salmon flow
program. The Council concluded that fluctuations in upriver storage reservoirs
should be limited to protect resident fish and wildlife in upriver reservoirs.
The Council program received measured support from Indian tribes and
environmental groups, and an industry lawsuit was later abandoned.29 However,
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) did not follow the Council's lead on
critical mainstem issues such as barge transportation and reservoir drawdowns.
As a result, federal agencies were faced with mixed messages regarding salmon
recovery. Moreover, shortly after the Council program was adopted, the Council's
27. See Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning From the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENvT. L. 431 (1986); John M. Volkman
& Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered
Species Act and Adaptive Management, 23 ENVT. L. 1249 (1993).
28. Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 27, at 1249.
29. The Idaho Power Company challenged the amendments. Idaho Power
operated the Hells Canyon dams on the Snake River. A coalition of aluminum
companies and other industrial interests moved to intervene in support of Idaho
Power's challenge, while the Yakama Indian Nation and a coalition of environmental
fishing organizations moved to intervene in support of the Council. After taking a closer
look at the Council's record and the interveners, Idaho Power withdrew its challenge.
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membership changed. The new Council asked a group of independent scientists
to review the scientific basis for the program. This review is now complete (see
discussion of Return to the River, below) and the Council expects to consider
amending the program in light of the review. Meanwhile, the long-term strategy
for mainstem measures remains in question.
Ill. The Endangered Species Act Program
While the Council was working its way thought the salmon issues, the
NMFS had begun to implement the Endangered Species Act (ESA). When
Snake River salmon were listed in 1992, many of the Endangered Species
Act's tools were brought into play: the federal consultation process, critical
habitat designation, recovery planning and habitat conservation planning.
This section reviews these tools and addresses the question posed by the
title of this article-whether they are adequate for the job.
A. The Endangered Species Act Tools
1. Federal Consultations on Hydropower System Operations
By many accounts, the most powerful ESA tool is the federal agency
consultation process mandated by section 7 of the Act.30 Section 7 requires
federal agencies proposing to take action that may adversely affect a listed
species to consult with the relevant federal fish and wildlife agency (the
NMFS, in the case of salmon) to ensure that the proposed action will not
jeopardize the continued existence of the species or adversely affect its
critical habitat. As part of the consultation process, the NMFS must issue a
Biological Opinion detailing how the proposed action would affect the
species. If NMFS believes the action would jeopardize the species, it must
suggest "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that would avoid jeopardy.3
To see how well the process is working with the salmon listings, it is worth
spending some time examining the consultation process on hydropower system
operations. In 1993, shortly after publication of the Strategy for Salmon, the NMFS
issued its Biological Opinion on the operation of the federal Columbia River
dams. The opinion added another two million acre-feet of stored water to the
Strategy for Salmon's Columbia River flows.32 The Opinion also called for a number
of other measures, studies and restrictions, many similar to the Strategy for
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(A)(2) (1996).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
32. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL MARING RSHERIES SERVICE, ENDANGERED
SPEOEsACT (ESA) SECnON 7 CONSULTATION REGARDING 1994-99 OPERATON OFTHE FEDERAL COLUMBIA
RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM IN 1994-98, (March 16, 1994).
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Salmon and some not, and concluded that the dam's operations would not
jeopardize the continued survival of the species.
The 1993 Biological Opinion was challenged in court by several
environmental groups, Indian tribes and the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game. In Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service, et al.,"
the court faulted the Biological Opinion and sent it back to the federal agencies.
The holding of the case was technical: that the Opinion used the wrong baseline
from which to measure the species' decline and relied on optimistic
assumptions about mitigation measures. The court did not stop at technical
defects, however. It made far-reaching observations on the underlying
substantive issues, concluding that "I ilnstead of looking for what can be done to
protect the species from jeopardy, the NMFS and the action agencies have
narrowly focused their attention on what the establishment is capable of
handling with minimal disruption."34 The court also counseled the federal
parties to open up the process in which the Biological Opinion had been
developed, to ensure that state fish and wildlife agency and tribal scientists
were heard: "The underlying root of the litigation problem is the feeling of these
parties that the federal government is simply not listening to them."35
Following the court's rebuke, the federal parties organized a large-scale
consultation process to work with the states and tribes to reanalyze technical
issues. The process concluded in March 1995. For the first time, the NMFS found
that dam operations were likely to jeopardize salmon survival. The 1995
Biological Opinion outlined a "reasonable and prudent alternative,36 that the
Service said would avoid jeopardy, essentially by providing even more storage
water for flow augmentation. Some state fish and wildlife agencies and tribes
remained dissatisfied with the process, however, and environmental groups
were not persuaded that the opinion was strong enough. The opinion was
challenged in federal district court in March of 1996.1
7
33. 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
action with instructions to dismiss it as moot in light of the fact that a new biological
opinion had already been developed by the time of the court of appeals' opinion. See
Idaho Fish & Game Dep't v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir.
1995). See also Aluminum Co. of America v. Bonneville Power Admin., 56 F.3d 1075
(9th cir. 1995) (related litigation involving the federal action agencies' reliance of the
biological opinion); Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. National Marine Fisheries Serv.,
56 F.3d 1060 (9th cir. 1995) (Challenge to the federal agencies' barge
transportation program).
34. Idaho Dep't Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp.
886, 900. (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th cir. 1995).
35. Id. at 900.
36. See supra note 31, and related discussion.
37. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., Civ. no. 96-384-MA
(D. Or. filed Mar. 13, 1996). The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied
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While the NMFS's most recent Biological Opinion and the Power
Planning Council fish and wildlife program have much in common, they
differ in key respects. The Biological Opinion puts more emphasis on
barging juvenile fish and less emphasis on improving migrating conditions
in the Snake River. The opinion avoids calling for the acquisition of
significant amounts of water from the Snake River Basin, and reserves
judgment on the advisability of lowering the level of Snake River reservoirs.
Instead of calling for measures in the Snake River system, the opinion draws
more heavily on storage projects in the Upper Columbia arm of the system
(Grand Coulee Dam in north-central Washington and Libby and Hungry
Horse Dams in Montana), so that Snake River fish will find a faster Columbia
River when they emerge from the Snake. However, not only does this
strategy raise a number of issues about the fate of the Snake River as a
home for salmon, it also raises concerns about impacts to resident fish and
wildlife populations that live in Upper Columbia reservoirs. Because it
focuses on ESA listed species, the Biological Opinion affords no apparent
protection for these populations.38
In April, 1997, the same federal judge who had thrown out the
Fisheries Service's 1993 Biological Opinion rejected challenges to the
Service's revised Biological Opinion. In American Rivers v. National Marine
Fisheries Service,39 plaintiff environmental groups asked the judge to hold that
the Fisheries Service's new Biological Opinion was arbitrary and capricious,
and that the federal agencies had not implemented the Biological Opinion's
reasonable and prudent alternative. In ruling on the environmental
plaintiffs' challenge, the court addressed two issues: One was the adequacy
of the Service's jeopardy analysis; a second concerned the federal agencies'
implementation of the Biological Opinion's reasonable and prudent
alternative. On the first issue, the court observed that the new Biological
Opinion was significantly different from the Opinion the court had struck
down, particularly in acknowledging the need for substantial change in the
configuration of the Columbia River dams: "NMFS has concluded that
without major modifications to the Snake and Columbia River dams, it is
unlikely survivals can be sufficiently improved to ensure that the operation
of the FCRPS does not impede the survival and recovery of listed Snake
and defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted. See 109 F. 3d 1484, 1490
(9th cir. 1997).
38. Kootenai River white sturgeon, which are listed as endangered, affect
operations at Montana's Libby Dam. See 59 Fed. Reg. 45,989 (1994). Snail species
that inhabit hot springs in central Idaho also are listed and can affect Snake River
flow operations; bull trout have been the subject of listing petitions, which the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service has found warranted but precluded by other priorities.
39. American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., Civil No. 96-384-MA,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5337 (D. Ore. April 3, 1997).
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River salmon."'4 Absent this finding, the court would have faced a very
different issue. The court also found that the Service had significantly
altered its jeopardy analysis based on its consultations with the parties,
state and tribal fish analysts, and independent peer review.
2. Critical Habitat Designation
The Endangered Species Act calls for the designation of critical habitat,
i.e., areas that are essential to the conservation of the species.4 In the
Columbia, the Fisheries Service accompanied its listing proposal with a
request for biological and economic information regarding critical habitat, and
convened two technical committees to assist the agency to gather
information.42 Several years before the Endangered Species Act listing, the
Power Planning Council had worked with the region's fish and wildlife
agencies, tribes, and the Bonneville Power Administration to identify
"protected areas"-about 44,000 miles of streams in which the Council
recommended against new hydropower development in order to protect
valuable fish and wildlife habitat. 43 The Fisheries Service was able to build on
this program. An Endangered Species Act critical habitat proposal was issued
in late 199244 and a final designation was adopted the next year. The
designations included the spawning and rearing grounds for the listed
populations and their migration corridors-the same spawning and rearing
tributaries through the mainstems of the Salmon, Snake, and Columbia Rivers
that had been designated "protected areas" by the Power Planning Council.
Critical habitat includes. not just specific areas that can be drawn on a
map, but also "those physical or biological features (I) essential to the
conservation of the species and (11) which may require special management
considerations or protection."46 In the Endangered Species Act process,
there was discussion in technical committees whether a critical habitat
designation might include, for example, a particular level of flow as a
"physical or biological" feature essential to the species. However, in the
40. Id. at 13.
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5) & 1533(a)(3) (1996).
42. Critical habitat designation is one of the few places in the Endangered
Species Act process where economics is a decision factor. An area may be excluded
from designation if NMFS determines that the overall benefits of exclusion outweigh
the benefits of designation, unless exclusion would result in extinction of the
species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(b)(l)(B)(2).
43. See COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH & WILDLIFE PROGRAM § 12.2, supra note 26.
44. See 57 Fed. Reg. 57,051 (1992).
45. See 58 Fed. Reg. 68,544 (1993).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
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event, the Fisheries Service listed only the general habitat characteristics
deemed essential to the species, e.g., substrate, water quality, quantity,
temperature and velocity, riparian vegetation and other factors.
Critical habitat designation must be accompanied by an assessment of the
designation's economic impacts.4 7 The Fisheries Service concluded that
designating critical habitat in the Columbia system would not have a major
impact on human activities. Based on its economic committee's evaluations,
4 8
and reasoning that the Act's consultation process already provided protection
against habitat-damaging activities, the Service found that the economic impact
of the proposed designations were likely to be minor. The Service maintained that
the primary effect of a critical habitat designation would be to clarify that there
must be consultation regarding federal activities that may affect designated
habitat, assist federal agencies in planning further actions, and help focus federal,
state and private conservation and management actions in these areas.
The apparent insignificance of the critical habitat process in the Columbia
appears paradoxical in light of the Endangered Species Act's express policy to
take an ecosystem perspective in implementing the Act. The importance of
healthy ecosystem functions is near the core of the ecosystem management
concept.49 There is an obvious overlap between ecosystem management and the
Endangered Species Act's requirement that critical habitat designation should
protect "physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the
species." If the Endangered Species Act were focused first and foremost on
protecting ecosystem functions, the critical habitat process might identify the
fundamental conditions toward which the Endangered Species Act process
would be geared. However, this is not what has happened in the Columbia.
Rather, decisions are aimed at reducing salmon mortality levels at various
points in the salmon migrations, which is consistent with a focus on listed
species rather than the ecological processes on which species depend.
3. Recovery Planning
James Watt once characterized recovery plans as "the real payoff under the
ESA." The success of the Act, he said, "is really measured by the success of
recovery efforts."'" In practice, however, recovery plans have a modest record.
47. 15 u.s.c. § 1533(b)(2).
48. DANIEL D. HUPPERT ET AL., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MANAGEMENT MEASURES WITHIN
THE RANGE OF POTENTIAL CRITICAL HABITAT FOR SNAKE RIVER ENDANGERED AND THREATENED
SALMON SPECIES (1992).
49. See Normal L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of American
Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665,
668-69 (1996).
50. Letter from James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. John B. Breaux,
U.S. Senate (Feb. 8, 1982), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2807, 2838.
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They have little legal force, binding only the agency that promulgates them.5'
They tend to take a long time to develop and, once developed, do little more
than maintain species at the levels that required listing in the first place.52 A
1993 study suggested that recovery plans generally do not aim for "recovery" as
the term is defined by the Endangered Species Act. The study reviewed all 314
available recovery plans approved by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Marine Fisheries Service as of August, 1991, and found that for species
for which population data were available, 28% had recovery goals set at or below
the population size that existed at the time of listing.3 The Fish and Wildlife
Service's own report to Congress in 1990 appears to reflect the same conclusion:
A more realistic measure of the Service's recovery efforts than
the number of species delisted is probably the proportion of
listed species whose status has been stabilized, particularly
among species that are habitat-limited and thus more vulnerable
to changes in their environment. Maintenance of remaining
populations of listed species and prevention of their extinction is
a basic objective of the program. 4
In the Columbia River, the Fisheries Service appointed a volunteer
recovery team of non-government scientists, engineers and an economist in
early 1992." The team compiled information, consulted with various parties
and, in late 1993, submitted its recommendations to the Fisheries Service.
The Fisheries Service gave its recovery team relatively free license to speak
publicly; 6 various team members lobbied for their recommendations not
just with the agency, but in the region and in Congress.
51. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 525 (11 th Cir. 1996).
52. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENTS COULD ENHANCE RECOVERY PROGRAM (1988); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS (1992).
53. Timothy H. Tear et al., Status and Prospects for Success of the Endangered Species
Act: A Look at Recovery Plans, 262 SCIENCE 976 (Nov. 12, 1993).
54. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REPORT TO
CONGRESS: ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PROGRAM 3 (1990).
55. The Secretary is authorized to retain help from outside the agency, and
may form recovery teams to provide advice on recovery plan development and
implementation. See 16 U.S.C. § 1633(f)(2). Recovery teams may be drawn from
experts within or outside the agency. Team recommendations are purely advisory. See
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATING
RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES, § 11, at 1 (1990).
56. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service guidelines emphasize that recovery team
recommendations do not represent the position of the agency; recovery teams may or
may not be asked to prepare final recovery plans; without the approval of the agency,
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In the spring of 1995, the Fisheries Service issu'ed a draft recovery
plan." It incorporated measures from the Service's Biological Opinions. It
addressed questions of institutional relationships and governance:
proposing that the National Marine Fisheries Service create a Salmon
Recovery Implementation Team, a Scientific Advisory Panel, a dispute
resolution process, and other measures. 8 In many areas, the proposals of
the Fisheries Service, the recovery team and the Power Planning Council's
fish and wildlife program are aligned. On some critical issues-the role of
barge transportation, reservoir drawdowns and water for flow augmentation-
they still differ. A final recovery plan has not yet been adopted.
4. Habitat Conservation Planning
There is a persuasive argument that nonfederal involvement in species
recovery is essential if listed species are to recover:
[T]he conservation of biodiversity will require a financial
commitment that cannot be provided by the public sector alone.
Private sector contributions to endangered species conservation
far surpass the federal endangered species budget .. Given the
reality of an annual $300 billion federal deficit and similar fiscal
problems at the state and local government level, it is doubtful
that the public sector contribution to endangered species
conservation will increase dramatically.
59
The habitat conservation planning provisions of the Endangered
Species Act provide a way to bring private parties into species recovery.
Private development that "harms" a listed species (harm may include habitat
destruction or modification) is an unlawful "taking" under the Act,
punishable by civil and criminal penalties.' In order to proceed, a private
recovery team members may not seek to influence agency policy outside agency
channels; and recovery plans are final only when they are adopted by the agency. See U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR RECOVERY PLANNING AND COORDINATING
RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES, app. 11 (1990). See also NATIONAL OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDELINES 3 (1992)
57. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE
RIVER SALMON (1995).
58. Id. § I11, at I.
59. Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation
Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605,656 (1991).
60. Section 9 prohibits "taking" listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1538. This prohibition
extends to both federal and nonfederal actions, including private activities. "Taking" is
defined broadly, to include "harm" to the species. Id. § 1532(19). "Harm" may include
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developer must obtain an "incidental take" permit. Such permits are issued
if a privately designed and funded habitat conservation plan is approved.
These plans are intended to offset any incidental taking by promoting
conservation of the species."'
Supporters of the habitat conservation planning provisions argue that this
process provides important opportunities for reconciling economic activities with
endangered species protection.62 For one thing, habitat conservation plans are
specifically authorized to address unlisted species," and for this reason they can be
more responsive to ecosystem considerations than can other processes under the Act.
There have been regional and national consultations regarding the possibility
that the Power Planning Council's fish and wildlife program could be structured to
satisfy the habitat conservation planning requirements of section 10. Would it be
possible to develop a long-term, four-state, multi-species plan backed up by the
financial, contractual, and other implementation commitments that section 10
seems to require? To date, these questions have been raised but not answered.
There are significant efforts to develop smaller scale habitat conservation
plans in the Columbia. Several watershed groups are talking to the Fisheries
Service about developing watershed-wide habitat conservation plans. The
public utility districts that own hydropower dams in the Mid-Columbia area of
Washington are working with the Fisheries Service on a plan. The Fisheries
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Environmental Protection Agency
have worked toward an integrated set of guidelines for habitat conservation
planning efforts to satisfy the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is working with private parties and local
watershed groups to facilitate the development of plans for spotted owls, with
incidental benefits for other species such as salmon. While progress in habitat
conservation planning comes piece by piece, these efforts are worth watching.
5. Broader Effects of the Act
Not all the Endangered Species Act's effects can be seen by examining
individual tools; some effects are apparent only when the Act is considered
harm to habitat (not just critical habitat) if it would adversely affect listed species. See
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 151 U.S. 687 (1995).
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2). For a detailed explanation of habitat conservation
plans, see MICHAEL 1. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING PROCESS (1991). Another avenue for private
developers is section 7 of the Act, under which a private developer seeking a federal
permit may secure an exemption through the Act's consultation process. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2). This exemption also requires a conservation plan. See id.
62. BEAN ETAL., supra note 61.
63. H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 30, (1982) reprinted in U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2860, 2871 (1982).
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wholesale. Of these, one of the most important is what has been called the
Act's "incentive structure": the "perception that the ESA's mandate is absolute
and nonnegotiable," which prompts others to address species declines.'
This incentive structure has played a major role in the Columbia River.
It is an oversimplification to say that the Endangered Species Act caused all
the salmon-related developments of 1991-1994. Other processes did much
of the heavy lifting-the region's political leaders in the Salmon Summit,
the Power Planning Council and state and tribal fish managers in the
Northwest Power Act processes, litigants in the court proceedings of 1994,
and a wide range of interested parties throughout. It may well be that the
salmon declines, the Northwest Resource Information Center ruling or the Power
Planning Council's program would have prompted these efforts even if there
were no Endangered Species Act. Yet it is certainly true that the Endangered
Species Act provided the immediate impetus to engage these processes.
The Act's second broad effect has been a shift in the burden of proof.
Protecting ecosystems from unwanted effects of new development can be heavy
work. Often, the short-term economic benefits of development are obvious, while
the benefits of environmental recovery are harder to predict, rarely appraisable in
economic terms, and easy to discount.. Although the Northwest Power Act tended
to shift this burden, the Endangered Species Act listings made the shift
unmistakable. For essentially the first time, proponents of development must
carry a burden of proof in which they must contend with the uncertainty involved
in predicting biological impacts. A fishery management agency has to be satisfied
that proposed federal activities will not jeopardize listed species. Moreover, one of
the surprising aspects of the Columbia River process is that this shift has occurred
not just with proposed federal projects, but for on-going federal activities such as
management of the Columbia River hydropower facilities. Because a federal plan
for operating the hydropower system must be developed each year, system
operations too must carry the burden of avoiding jeopardy to the species.
These broad effects-the Act's incentive structure and the shift in the
burden of proof favoring species protection-may well be the most
significant Endangered Species Act's tools.
C. The Limitations of the Tools
These tools are impressive, but in judging how far the Act can protect
diverse species, it is also important to understand their limitation. This
section reviews some of these limitations: the Act's focus on listed species
rather than ecosystem functions; the emphasis on federal activities; the
64. STEVEN YAFFEE & JULIA WONDOLLECK, SCHOOL OF NATURAL RESOURCES &
ENVIRONMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, NEGOTIATING SURVIVAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
POTENTIAL USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS
BETWEEN ENDANGERED SPECIES AND DEVELOPMENT 55 (1994).
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constraints imposed by other laws; the priority on avoiding jeopardy to
listed species rather than recovery; and other limitations.
I. The Focus on Species
One of the important limitations of the Columbia River salmon
recovery effort is that it is focused on salmon, not ecosystems or
biodiversity. Biodiversity protection implies protection for whole
communities of organisms, what Aldo Leopold described as the "hundred
distinctive species . . . all interlocked in one humming community of co-
operations and competitions, one biota."65 To conservation biologists,
microorganisms may be more significant than animals, and the overall
structure and complexity of an ecological system are more important than
individual species.66 In contrast, species protection tends to emphasize what
Leopold called "show pieces": individual species like salmon, which people
treasure. In focusing on show pieces, we pay attention to one set of issues
and neglect others that may be more important.The Endangered Species Act does not completely ignore the importance of
ecosystems. One of the Act's purposes is to "provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species or threatened species depend may
be preserved." 7 For many years, however, this seemed to be primarily a rhetorical
principle, and critics contended that the Act actually diverted attention from the
more important task of preserving biodiversity. ' This emphasis may be changing.
In a July, 1994 policy statement, the Departments of Interior and Commerce
committed to develop recovery plans in a way that "restores, reconstructs, or
rehabilitates the structure, distribution, connectivity and function upon which...
listed species depend."69 However, the Act's federal agency consultation process
remains focused on individual species and to this point there has been no explicit
attempt to take an ecosystem approach to federal consultations on the Columbia.
65. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 193 (1966).
66. See id. at 253.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). In addition, the consultation regulations require
federal agencies to consider "the direct and indirect effects of Itheirl actionlsl on the
species or critical habitat, together with the effects of other activities that are
interrelated or interdependent with that action..." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
68. Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Imprving Legal Pr0mtion of Bilogical Diwrsity, 18 ECOLOGY
L.O. 265(1991); Michael L. Goodman, Pretving the Genetic Divrsity of Salmonid Stcxks: A Call For Faled
Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 ENvrL. L. I1I, 148-155 (1990); Suzanne Windder, Stopgap Measures:
Preserving the Emsystems as a Means of Wildlif Conservation, ATLA'nc MONTHLY 74, 78 (Jan. 1992).
69. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE &
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED AND THREATENED WILDLIFE AND PLANTS:
NOTICE OF INTERAGENCY COOPERATIVE POLICY FOR THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, 59 Fed. Reg. 34274 (1994).
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2. The Emphasis on Federal Resources and Activities
One of the limitations in the Endangered Species Act's consultation process
is its emphasis on federal resources and activities rather than the broader collection
of federal, state and private activities that an ecosystem approach to restoration
would suggest. The point is illustrated by the contrast between the Endangered
Species Act Biological Opinion's approach to the Snake River and the approach
taken in the Power Planning Council's 1994 program. The Council's 1994 program
emphasizes solutions for Snake River fish in the Snake River Basin. Not only does
the program call for Snake River reservoir drawdowns, but it proposes to use
hydropower revenues to fund water leases, water conservation and other measures
that could leave an additional million acre-feet in the Snake River for salmon. The
Biological Opinion offers limited Snake River measures and instead relies more
heavily on transportation and infusions of Columbia River water to augment flows.
In one sense, these differences are predictable because some of the measures
proposed by the Power Planning Council involve private property interests-Snake
River water rights. The ESA can't do much where private property interests are
involved. Even if this water could be secured, in order to use it for salmon it would
have to be "shaped" through privately-managed hydropower projects. The number
of hurdles that would have to be leaped-the legal, political and social barriers to
water acquisition, and the difficulty of shaping any water that is acquired-is
daunting. Seeing these obstacles, the Fisheries Service "reasonable and'prudent
alternative" for river operations does not count on this water. Because the Columbia
is less affected with private claims, it is easier for the Fisheries Service to tap. The
Biological Opinion follows a path of less resistance, which leads to federal resources
and activities. The Power Planning Council saw the same obstacles, but chose to
attempt to overcome them.
The Endangered Species Act approach points to a key problem for
ecosystem recovery. The salmon ecosystem is a patchwork of federal and
private property interests. The fact that the Endangered Species Act has no
way to cope with this patchwork is hardly surprising. Yet, if an ecosystem
approach is essential, some way must be found to provide an ecosystem for
fish even in the face of divided jurisdictions and diverse property interests."0
3. The Constraints of Existing Law
A third limitation in the Endangered Species Act consultation process
is that much of the problem faced by salmon is due to development that has
already occurred. Where ecosystem recovery requires that development be
70. See John M. Volkman & Kai N. Lee, The Owl and Minerva: Ecosystem Lessons from
the Columbia, 92 J. FORESTRY 48 (1994).
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter 2008
undone, legislation is likely to be required and the Endangered Species Act
cannot require legislation.
The problem is illustrated by the reservoir drawdown debate. Reservoir
drawdown advocates argue that lower reservoirs will increase the speed of
the river (hence of fish migrating downstream) and help reestablish
productive riparian areas at the edge of the river-a benefit to fish and
wildlife, listed and otherwise. But drawdowns require significant changes in
the dams themselves. Depending on their nature and timing, drawdowns
could interfere with and perhaps preclude river transportation. Even
intermediate-level drawdowns can adversely affect the operation of juvenile
and adult fish passage facilities at the dams. As noted above, the Power
Planning Council program calls for drawdowns while the National Marine
Fisheries Service remains undecided. Congress, seeing risks and uncertainty,
has withheld funding for studies of some drawdown evaluations.
If the Endangered Species Act process endorses drawdowns,
implementation would probably require congressional action, either through
appropriations or authorizing legislation. Biological opinions do not bind
Congress. For proposals such as reservoir drawdowns, the Endangered Species
Act can provide impetus for change, but it cannot require change.
4. The Difference Between Avoiding Jeopardy and
Recovering Species
It is a commonplace that most of the muscle in the Endangered
Species Act is in its federal agency consultation process. Yet, the
consultation process aims at avoiding species extinction rather than
restoring species to healthy levels.7 So far, this commonplace has been
borne out in the Columbia River. The Act's Biological Opinions are making
themselves strongly felt in a variety of federal activities: in the operation of
the hydropower system, in habitat management and elsewhere. But what the
Endangered Species Act is good at-reshaping federal activity that
jeopardizes species-does not add up to species (or ecosystem) recovery.
5. Procedural Limitations
A fifth issue in the Endangered Species Act consultation process is
procedural. The consultation process includes the federal agency that is
proposing to act and the agency that administers the Act, in this case the
National Marine Fisheries Service. If there is reason to think that a federally-
licensed, privately-developed project will affect a listed species, a federal
71. See e.g., DANIEL ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS
PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 26 (1989).
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permit or license applicant may also participate.72 However, there is no
explicit provision for participation by a broader range of parties.
There is a rationale for a relatively closed process: the consultation
process is supposed to last for only 90 days and broad participation could make
this impossible, particularly if involving outside parties requires compliance
with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.73 The judgments that are made in the
consultation process are primarily scientific and technical, an area where
expertise would seem more appropriate than the views of interested parties.
In the Columbia River, however, a closed process poses special problems.
For ten years before the Endangered Species Act listings, the Columbia River
Indian tribes, the Power Planning Council, the region's fish and wildlife
agencies, utilities, environmental groups, and others worked to open up the
federal process in which river management decisions were made. The result was
no doubt messy--endless meetings, reams of issue papers, noisy debate and
friction-but the decision making process was at least accessible. Under the
Endangered Species Act process, interested parties, unable to watch or
participate in the decision making process, have had little trust in agency
determinations. Indeed, the court in Idaho Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries
Service attributed the hydropower litigation to this factor as much as any other:
"The underlying root of the litigation problem is the feeling of these parties that
the federal government is simply not listening to them."74
The reality is that the problem is not just procedural. Some of those affected
by Endangered Species Act decisions are not just looking for a process in which
they can make their concerns known, but a process in which their concerns will be
accommodated. If the problem were only procedural, it might be easier to
address. The Administration has adopted a policy intended to involve a broader
range of interested parties in recovery plan development.75 The Columbia River
process is being opened up. The consultation process convened by the parties
72. See 16 U:S.C. § 1536(a)(3) as amended, 51 Fed. Reg. 19926, 19939 (1986)
(Endangered Species Act section 7(a)(3) Interagency Cooperation).
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 2 (1993). Several Endangered Species Act processes have run afoul of
the Advisory Committee Act, see Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
No. 93-AR-2322-S, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20.22 at *6 (N.D Ala. Dec 22, 1993) (Fish and Wildlife
Service enjoined from "publishing, employing and relying upon the Advisory Committee
report...for any purpose whatsoever, directly or indirectly, in the process of determining whether
or not to list the Alabama sturgeon as an endangered species"); Northwest Forest Resource
Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009, 1015 (D.D.C.1994) (declaratory judgment that Forest
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team was an advisory committee that should have been
constituted and conducted under the Advisory Committee Act).
74. Id. at 36-67.
75. See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Recovery Plan Participation and
Implementation Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34272 (1994).
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following the court's opinion brought many state and tribal parties to the table."6
Since 1995 the Fisheries Service has made a concerted effort to bring state and
tribal fishery managers into an organized structure for hydropower system
operations and recovery plan implementation. But, in 1997 after the federal court
upheld the Fisheries Service Biological Opinion on hydropower operations based
in part on the Service's implementation process, the process began to fall apart.
The State of Montana withdrew, saying that the process had failed to account for
resident fish and other values residing in its headwater reservoirs. Montana's seat
was still cooling when the four Columbia River treaty tribes withdrew. "The
process does not facilitate collaborative decision making among sovereigns," said
the director of the tribes' fish commission. "It only provides a shield to cover
ongoing federal hegemony."" These things are evidence not just of a procedural
failing in the law, but a range of deeper concerns: the concerns of headwater areas
that are taxed by downriver power, flood control, and salmon flow augmentation
uses; the sense of Montana and the tribes that their sovereignty is being treated
too lightly; the tension between the tribes' interest in fish harvest and the
Endangered Species Act's interest in protecting particular, list fish populations;
and, possibly, the tribes' sense that the federal process is not headed toward
salmon recovery, but continued decline.
6. Broader Limitations of the Act
just as the Endangered Species Act has had broader effects than can be
attributed to any specific tool, some of the Act's limitations are broader than the
species just detailed. For example, the fact that the Act is powerful and is
perceived as uncompromising can generate political opposition. That the
Endangered Species Act program is federal can compound this mistrust. The
more exclusively federal the process is, the deeper the mistrust. And while some
of this mistrust is unavoidable, the Act's procedural limitations fuel the fire. In a
sense, these effects are the converse of the Act's "incentive structure": the Act's
most forceful characteristics generate the most forceful opposition.
The fact that the Act takes little account of economic considerations"
reflects problems of a different kind. Species are in trouble because of the
76. A challenge to the process based on its failure to observe the requirements of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act was rejected in Aluminum Co. v. National Marine
Fisheries Serv., 92 F.3d 902 (9th cir. 1996).
77. Ted Strong, Executive Director, Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission,
quoted in Trial sovereignty, treaty rights at core of tribes' rejection of NMFS's salmon management forum,
THE NORTHWEST SALMON RECOVERY REPORT, May 30, 1997, at 11.
78. The Endangered Spedes Act requires critical habitat designation to be accompanied by
an assessment of economic effects. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). Reasonable and prudent alternatives
under section 7 of the Act must be "economically and technically feasible." 50 C.F.R § 402.02. The Act
also requires an estimate of the cost of recovery plans. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(B)(iii).
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habitat impacts of economic development. If the Endangered Species Act
were well funded (which it is not in most parts of the country),79 it might
contend with some of the effects of this development. But there are limits to
the effectiveness of even the best-funded regulatory programs.
Acknowledging this, some students of the Endangered Species Act have
suggested that the Act's regulatory tools should be augmented with
economic incentives, so that economics work for species recovery.8"
Addressing economic problems of this kind requires tool that are rarely in
evidence in agency-administered species conservation processes-
analytical capacity to explore the economic implications of alternative
recovery strategies, financing to reshape existing development, and
economic incentives for appropriate development. The Endangered Species
Act has not had these tools in abundance, and no one has a very clear idea
of whether they could compete with the powerful engines of economic
development. Yet, ignoring economic issues simply means that large
obstacles to recovery remain unaddressed.
IV. The Endangered Species Act, Ecosystem Science and the
Northwest Energy System
With all its assets and liabilities, the Endangered Species Act is an
extremely important factor in Columbia River salmon policy. But some
changes will be required if it is to foster ecosystem recovery. Shifting the
direction of the Endangered Species Act process away from individual
species poses a particular problem for an Act whose tools are keyed to
species. Even apart from this limitation, the Act will, as ever, run against the
enormous momentum of economics and status quo salmon policy. This
section discusses some of the shapes these challenges may take.
79. There are several analyses of the funding history. See FAITH CAMPBELL, The
Appropriations History, reprinted in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF ExTINCTION 134 (1991);
Michael 1. Bean, Issues and Controversies in the Forthcoming Reauthorization Battle, 9
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 1 (1991).
80. See Jim McKinney, et al., Economic Incentives to Preserving Endangered Species Habitat
and Biodiversity on Private Lands, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT (Wendy E. Hudson, ed. 1993) (hereinafter BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT); Michael J. Bean, Incentive-Based Approaches to Conserving Red-
Cockaded Woodpeckers in the Sandhills of North Carolina, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT; Walter V. Reid, Creating Incentives for Conserving Biodiversity, in
BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT; Randal O'Toole, Building
Incentives into the Endangered Species Act, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT; lames Baden, Toward a True ESA: An Ecological Stewardship Act, in BUILDING
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT.
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A. Salmon and Ecosystem Science: Return to the River
For decades, salmon mitigation programs have relied on technological
surrogates for salmon habitat-barges to transport fish down an increasingly
inhospitable river, hatcheries to feed harvesters' appetite for fish, mechanical
screens to keep fish away from turbines, and other engineering solutions. The
assumption has been that these technological methods will be enough to
maintain reasonably productive salmon populations. But these solutions have
largely ignored the importance of natural ecosystem processes.
Return to the River, a 1996 report from a group of independent scientists
convened by the Power Planning Council, suggests that continuing a
technology-based approach to salmon recovery will lead to the extinction of
wild salmon runs by the end of the next century.8' Over the long term, according
to the report, salmon recovery requires restoration of natural functions:
The history of salmon restoration is rooted in technology, such
as bypass facilities and hatcheries. [We recommend I keeping the
salmon in their habitat and letting the river do the work. 2
To avoid continuing extinction, Return to the River urges attention to all parts
of the salmon ecosystem, especially measures to restore interconnecting salmon
habitats, natural stream channels, and ecological processes that produce
nutrients that salmon need for feeding, resting and spawning.
Return to the River's prescription is more ambiguous than it may sound. The
report does not suggest that the river must return to its pre-development
condition in order for salmon to survive. Nor does it try to spell out exactly how far
toward those conditions the river would have to return. Rather, the report
suggests a direction more than a destination. If productive salmon populations are
to be reestablished, the report urges, the region has to restore some of the river's
natural functions. This is an important statement: it tells us to abandon the idea
that we can either stand pat with existing mitigation programs or undertake new
development expecting to offset it with traditional forms of salmon mitigation. It
tells us that we must put more back into the river than we are accustomed to take
out. But it does not say how far in that direction, or how fast we need to go. It also
does not tell us that some degree of reliance on technological solutions should
not be part of the prescription.
Given these ambiguities, an ecosystem approach may pose many of
the same dilemmas that we have faced for the last several decades of
salmon policy. Salmon will continue to be a central focus. in any ecosystem
recovery process on the Columbia River because of their legal and cultural
importance. The question is whether ecosystem science can begin to turn
81. RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 1.
82. Id.
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the direction of policy so that rehabilitation of natural ecosystem functions,
rather than survival trends of individual populations, is the lodestar for
recovery. At best, however, this shift will entail an ambiguous balance
between rehabilitation of natural systems and refinement of technological
surrogates, with the balance moving progressively toward the former.
This shift is a difficult prospect for both the Endangered Species Act and
the Northwest Power Act processes. The Endangered Species Act process will
face one of its own internal contradictions: can a law designed to protect
particular species support a recovery program that is aimed primarily at
protecting ecosystem functions? The National Marine Fisheries Service recovery
plan, which is in draft, will likely have to consider this question and the specific
implications of Return to the River before the plan is made final. For its part, the
Power Planning Council plans to reopen its Fish and Wildlife Program on the
basis of Return to the River, and in doing so the Council will be faced with all of the
dilemmas that lurk in .the idea of ecosystem rehabilitation.
Both processes will face risky and ambiguous choices. While an ecosystem
approach has considerable appeal, it is possible that we could throw away our
technological crutches but will not be able to do enough in the river to make a
real difference. Or that throwing away crutches will be accompanied by a
disastrous downturn in ocean conditions that we erroneously ascribe to the lack
of crutches. Or that we will take too long to restore connections between
habitats and lose the opportunity to reestablish healthy metapopulations of
salmon. All of which will suggest caution in abandoning. artificial supports. If we
retain technologically-oriented programs, we divert resources from
rehabilitating natural riverine processes. So, for the longer term, a shift toward
ecosystem processes has to acquire a momentum of its own. The question is
how such momentum can be generated.
B. New Scientific Scrutiny of Fish and Wildlife Expenditures
In early 1996, the Power Planning Council and the National Marine
Fisheries Service impaneled a joint science board for the two agencies,
called the independent Scientific Advisory Board. Most of the board's
membership was taken from the Independent Scientific Group-authors of
Return to the River. The board's role was strengthened in late 1996, when an
Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill required the Power
Planning Council to oversee proposals for Bonneville fish and wildlife
funding, with advice from a panel of independent scientists and peer
reviewers." The Council appointed most of the members of the Independent
Scientific Advisory Board to act as the review panel. Recommendations of
83. Until the amendment, the Northwest Power Act had not explicitly recognized
a Council role in program implementation, but had recognized a role for the Council in
planning, see 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)-(9), and oversight, see id. at § 839b(i).
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the Panel and the peer review groups are to consider whether "projects: are
based on sound science principles; benefit fish and wildlife, and have a
clearly defined objective and outcome with provisions for monitoring and
evaluation of results." In reviewing the advice of the Panel and peer review
groups and in making its own recommendations regarding Bonneville
funding, the Council must "consider the impact of ocean conditions," and
"determine whether the projects employ cost effective measures to achieve
program objectives." The Council must explain in writing if it decides not to
incorporate a recommendation of the Panel.
Accordingly, for the first time a group of independent scientists
committed to ecosystem rehabilitation as the primary route to salmon
recovery is in a position to advise the region on recovery strategy (through
Return to the River), implementation of the Endangered Species Act and
Northwest Power Act programs (as the Independent Scientific Advisory
Board), and Bonneville Power Administration's fish and wildlife
expenditures (through the Energy and Water Development Appropriations
bill). While this development holds promise for ecosystem recovery, it also
enlarges prospects for conflict with the way river operations and fishery
mitigation programs are currently run.
C. A River and an Energy System in Transition
Recent upheavals in the electric energy industry pose important
questions regarding how ecosystem recovery might be financed and
managed. Beginning in the early 1990s, the electric power industry began a
transition from its traditional status as a regulated industry, to a competitive
industry. 4 For the first time, the Bonneville Power Administration, which
finances the bulk of the salmon recovery program, was expected to compete
for customers." Faced with this transition, Bonneville was concerned that it
would have to bear escalating costs that it could not control, such as those
for fish and wildlife recovery. In 1995 and 1996, viith Congress threatening
to enact a cap on Bonneville's Fish and Wildlife expenses, the Clinton
Administration established a six-year budget for Bonneville fish and wildlife
funding.' The budget was established through a federal inter-agency
84. See Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992-
Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE I. ON REG. 447 (1993).
85. See Timothy A. Johnson, Coping with Change: Energy, Fish and the Bonneville
Power Administration, 26 ENVTL. L. 589 (1996).
86. MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT AMONG THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR CONCERNING THE
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION'S RNANcIAL COMMITMENT FOR THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN ASH
AND WILDLIFE COSTS (Sept. 16, 1996). The September 1996 Memorandum of Agreement put
the finishing touches on a draft agreement negotiated by the National Marine Fisheries
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agreement in which the Power Planning Council and the region's Indian
tribes were active participants but not signatories. The Agreement commits
Bonneville to use $252 million per year in hydropower revenues for fish and
wildlife projects arising under the Council program and the ESA Biological
Opinion. In addition, Bonneville agrees to bear the financial consequences
of implementing the Biological Opinion's river operations-flow and spill.
Finally, under certain circumstances Bonneville may tap a federal
"contingency fund": several hundred million dollars in Treasury credits
ascribed to Bonneville's having financed fish and wildlife measures not
allocable to the dams' hydropower features." The U.S. Treasury and the
Office of Management and Budget, the jealous guardians of the contingency
fund, played significant roles in the agreement's development. Not
incidentally, the Agreement commits the federal agencies to collaborate
much more closely with the region in developing federal funding requests.
Service, the Bonneville Power Administration and the chairman of the Northwest Power
Planning Council in the fall of 1995 in response to congressional pressure to protect
Bonneville's finances. The Administration's Office of Management and Budged endorsed
the draft agreement as."providing greater financial certainty to BPA and its customers
relating to its fish and wildlife obligations while simultaneously assuring that the 1995
Biological Opinion and the Northwest Power Planning Council's Fish and Wildlife Program
will be implemented in a way which helps assure recovery of the dwindling salmon runs."
Letter from Alice Rivlin to Hon. Mark Hatfield, United States Senate (Oct. 24, 1995)
[hereinafter Rivlin Letter]. The Agreement is part of a larger package of measures intended
to guarantee Bonneville's health.
87. The Columbia River dams'were authorized for multiple purposes: hydropower
generation, flood control, navigation and other purposes. Under the Northwest Power
Act, the Bonneville Power Administration is authorized to allocate its fish and wildlife
expenditures "among the various hydroelectric projects ... land] to the various project
purposes in accordance with the existing accounting procedures for the Federal Columbia
River Power System." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(C). The House Interior Committee report's
analysis of this provision noted that "[alll expenditures by BPA are to be made on a
reimbursable basis vis-6-vis other project purposes, although BPA will have the flexibility
to treat expenditures in excess of its allocated share as being payments for other project
costs for which BPA is responsible under existing law." 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Rept. 96-976,
pt. 2 at 45. The section its legislative history have been interpreted as authorizing
Bonneville to credit fish and wildlife expenditures for which hydropower is not strictly
accountable against sums Bonneville owes the Treasury for the dams' construction. The
theory was first raised by a law student, and later adapted by Bonneville. See Steven
Brown, Breathing Life into a Drowned Resource: Mitigating Wildlife Losses in the Columbia Basin Under
the Northwest PowerAct, 18 ENVTL. L. 597 (1988); Memorandum from Harvard Spigal, General
Counsel, to Randy Hardy, Administrator and Chief Executive Officer, Bonneville Power
Administration (June 6, 1994) (regarding Interpretation of Section 4(h)(10)(C) of the
Northwest Power Act); Rivlin Letter, supra note 86.
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The Agreement also incorporates an Annex in which the parties agree to
continue to improve the region's ability to prioritize budget expenditures
and monitor and evaluate progress in fish and wildlife recovery.
The Memorandum of Agreement adds an element of stability to fish and
wildlife costs that is important to power system operators. It is a limited form of
stability, however: it is an interagency understanding; it will last only through
2001; and even during this period it is possible that a court or Congress could
impose additional fish and wildlife obligations on Bonneville. Perhaps most
important, the agreement is premised on visions of salmon recovery and the
shape of the power system that may or may not be outdated.
The vision of salmon recovery that underlies the agreement. is the vision
that was in place before Return to the River. Return implies big-ticket changes for
the dams, and urges an ecosystem approach whose outlines are as yet unclear.
While no one has yet decided what the dam alterations should be, it is hard to
be confident that the Bonneville fund can finance these alterations and also
play a significant role in restoring other parts of the ecosystem.
Another premise for the budget agreement was the assumption that
Bonneville and the hydropower system would survive the transition to a
competition system in a more or less recognizable form. It is possible that they
will. In 1996, a broad-based regional process called the "Comprehensive Review
of the Region's Energy System" came together on a proposal that by and large
protect a cost-based energy system for the region. 8 The proposal also makes
provision for energy conservation, renewable energy, low-income protection and
fish and wildlife restoration. But there are many questions about the proposal.
Fish and wildlife advocates are likely to insist on a variety of assurances that fish
and wildlife are adequately provided for, assurances they don't see in the report.
And at bottom, the report does not attempt to resolve the central issue in the
fish-power debate: to what extent will the hydropower projects be configured
and operated to protect fish and wildlife and to what extent will the system by
dedicated to power production. While no one expected the Comprehensive
Review to resolve this issue, it is bound to be a large part of the subtext in the
debate that the proposal is expected to provoke.
Equally important, no one can predict what reception the proposal
might meet within Congress. As one of the members of the Review's steering
committee described it:
It appears certain that there will be national energy industry
restructuring legislation in the next Congress, perhaps in the next
year. The steering committee has been told by members of
Congress and the Clinton Administration that the region has a
chance to write the Northwest chapter of that legislation-but only
88. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE NORTHWEST ENERGY SYSTEM, TOWARD A
COMPETITIVE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 12, 1996).
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if there is a clear consensus in the region. If there is not, we have
been warned that forces outside the region will have a field day.
They will figure out that there are billions of dollars of long-term
benefits in the Columbia River hydrosystem and they will take
those benefits. It is certain that the electricity industry will be
restructured and the stakes are very high for this region.89
This debate is also wrapped up with issues of river governance. The
governance question was explicitly raised in a November, 1995 directive
from Congress, which emerged from the same legislative initiative that was
mooted by the Memorandum of Agreement on Bonneville fish and wildlife
funding. An energy and water appropriations bill directed the Power
Planning Council to report to Congress within 180 days "regarding the most
appropriate governance structure to allow more effective regional control
over efforts to conserve and enhance anadromous and resident fish and
wildlife within the Federal Columbia River Power System. ''9 The immediate
impetus for the legislation was concern that the Endangered Species Act
process was eclipsing regional influence in the river, but the fragmentation
of fish and wildlife policy had been a concern for many years.9
In the process of developing its governance report, the Council heard
several proposals for long-term institutional change, but none of these
proposals were strongly advocated. Indeed, there was a general sense
expressed by industry groups, environmentalists and utilities that changes
in the Northwest Power Act and the Endangered Species Act were
undesirable. Because this conclusion was not clearly explained, the Council
tried to sharpen the discussion by laying out several options.
Under one option, Congress would require all federal agencies to act
consistently with the Council's fish and wildlife program. This would be a
way to ensure that federal agencies are making the most of the region's
program, but stop short of a mandatory program. If this change were
augmented with meaningful dispute resolution mechanisms and direction
to all the federal agencies to participate in an integrated budget process,
these would be significant changes.
89. Richard Applegate, Much to Change, Much Remains the Same, Address
Before the Northwest Water Law and Policy Project's Conference (Nov. 15, 1996).
90. Energy & Water Development Appropriations Act, 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-46,
§ 508(c)(1), 109 Stat. 402, 420 (1995).
91. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel K. Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery:
Conservation and Alkwtion of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 KAN. L. REv. 17, 104 (1983).
("Congress and the courts, in their determined efforts to extend a measure of protection to a
threatened resource and to allocate its harvest more fairly, have unwittingly multiplied
management authority to the point where they very institutions designed to protect the resource
have now, by virtue of their numbers and their unwieldiness, become an additional threat").
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
Under a second option, Congress would create a federal-state-tribal
resource council, and give it responsibility to implement the Northwest
Power Act, the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act insofar as
the Columbia River and Columbia River species are concerned. This would
require a major realignment of the region's fish and wildlife institutions, and
a re-write of several federal laws.
As broad as these changes would be, Congress could go further.
Senator Hatfield periodically reminds the region that the Columbia is a river,
not just a collection of water uses. Congress could create a single authority
to make all decisions about the Columbia River and its watershed. The
Council convened a two-day workshop in February, 1996 to brainstorm these
options and search for others. The process was productive, but did not lead
to any clear consensus for legislative change.
The hesitation to pursue legislation may have stemmed in part from a
realization of how fundamental these issues are. Are we dealing only with a
salmon problem? If so, we are talking about a broad geographical range,
including a large swath of the ocean. Are we more interested in integrating
river management to meet multiple needs, not just those of salmon? Are we
talking about management of the entire Columbia River watershed-all the
land and water uses that determine the watershed's health-under some
model of ecosystem management? What weight should be assigned to the
interests of shrinking wild populations, Indian treaty obligations, economic
values and community interests?
In its final report to Congress in May, 1996, the Council did not resolve
all these questions, but recommended incremental steps to encourage
consistency in fish and wildlife policy.92 In general, the Council called for
better collaboration rather than sweeping changes in authority. However,
the Council also said that if collaboration fails, legislation should require
federal agencies to act consistently with the Council's program.
The Council's 1996 report proved to be just a temporary lull in the
governance debate. The issue quickly arose in the Comprehensive Energy
Review. Just as the choice of a salmon recovery strategy can have economic
implications for the energy industry, the terms under which the hydropower
system is allocated and managed can determine the hydropower system's
contribution to species recovery. The Review considered itself ill constituted
to address issues that are so centrally concerned with fish and wildlife.
Accordingly, its final report urges the region's governors to establish a
process to find a more definitive resolution for the governance issue:
IW]e cannot expect to achieve both the degree of cost stability the
electricity industry requires to maintain the benefits of the Columbia River
92. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISH AND
WILDLIFE GOVERNANCE AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER HYDROPOWER SYSTEM (1996).
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Power System for the region and achieve sustainable fish restoration unless
we ensure predictability, accountability and effective governance for the fish
and wildlife interests of the river. In short, an effective condusion of our
effort is not possible without an improved system of river governance that
pursues fish restoration as a high priority.9'
With this statement, the Northwest stands perched at the edge of a new set of
challenges: an emerging vision of ecosystem science that poses large but
ambiguous challenges to current approaches to river and salmon
management; a growing commitment to science-based species recovery;
unprecedented instability in an energy system that is based on the Columbia
River; and growing restiveness with the way the river is governed. This is the
neighborhood in which ecosystem salmon recovery must look for a home.
V. Conclusion
It is a time of unusual peril for Columbia River salmon, but peril
sometimes borders on opportunity. The implications of ecosystem recovery
and biodiversity protection in the Columbia River may be clearer in a scientific
sense than they ever have been. The scientific community has made progress
in describing the ecosystem salmon need-an ecosystem with intact natural
functions and that supports diverse species. We have as powerful a set of
tools for dealing with these problems as there is anywhere on the planet: the
Endangered Species Act, the Northwest Power Act, and Indian and
international treaties. Whatever the shortcomings of these laws, they
represent an impressive arsenal. There is broad support for salmon recovery in
many parts of the Northwest. In their precarious condition, wild salmon are
likely to maintain their visibility as an important regional and national icon..
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that a collection of laws and
broad public sympathy are enough to restore wild salmon. What has
happened in the Columbia has not happened for lack of law or sympathy, or
because people are trying to eradicate salmon. It has been an effect of the
ways in which we lead our lives-the way we generate power, grow crops,
ship grain and harvest timber. As Richard White put it in The Organic Machine:
The architects of the new river have been nearly constant in
their protestations of concern for salmon, but they have quite
consciously made a choice against the conditions that
produce salmon. They have wanted the river and its
watershed to say electricity, lumber, cattle, and fruit and
93. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE NORTHWEST ENERGY SYSTEM, TOWARD A
COMPETITIVE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY 4 (1994) (draft report).
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together these have translated into carp, shad, and squawfish
instead of salmon.94
The Northwest will need an almost unimaginably broad consensus to
make ecosystem recovery work, and it will require much more than laws and
bureaucracies. The Endangered Species Act, the Northwest Power Act, the
Columbia River Indian treaties and other laws will have to work together to
shore up each other's inadequacies, and do so with a careful appreciation of
scientific data and methods. The issues at play in the Comprehensive Energy
Review and Congressional, the administrative processes that influence the
Bonneville Power Administration's fish and wildlife budget, and the
activities of federal, state and tribal land and water management agencies
have the potential to contribute to or defeat solutions. And a significant
number of the Northwest's people and economic enterprises must change
the way they do things.
No one can be sanguine about the outcome of such an undertaking. It
is probably true that few Northwesterners wish to write a new entry for the
Microsoft Encarta telling of the Columbia River salmon's ultimate slide to
extinction. But this still leaves two possibilities. One is that Microsoft will
leave the current entry unchanged and the Pacific coast will be rife with
salmon canneries only in Encarta's virtual world. The other possibility is that
the people of the Northwest will find ways to translate their feeling for
salmon into rivers and communities that are not just part of an economy,
but part of an ecosystem. If this occurs, the Endangered Species Act
probably will have been an important contributing factor. But not as
important as the region's will to protect salmon, rivers and diverse species.
94. RICHARD WHITE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE 90 (1995).
